Sunzi ja Zhuge Liangi järeltulijad

Mulle tundub, et sõjaasjanduses ja sõjamõtlemises on hiinlased eurooplastest üldiselt peajagu üle olnud. Ma ei pea silmas eeskätt sõjariistu, millega eurooplased uusajal ülekaalu saavutasid, vaid just sõjalist mõtlemist. Sel teemal on rääkinud nt. Francois Jullien (Traité de l'efficacité) ja Chet Richards (Certain to Win).

Paar väljavõtet Wikipedia artiklist „Korean War“):

In How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (2003), Bevin Alexander reports:

The usual method [of the Chinese - M.O.] was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics.

In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, R.E. Appleman delineates the PVA’s encirclement attack:

In the First Phase Offensive, highly-skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained, disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the UN forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic, which they termed Hachi Shiki, which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move [in]; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy, while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch’osan, but with only partial success at Pakch’on and the Ch’ongch’on bridgehead.

In January 1951, the PVA and the KPA launched their Third Phase Offensive (aka the “Chinese Winter Offensive”), utilizing night attacks in which UN Command fighting positions were stealthily encircled and then assaulted by numerically superior enemy troops who had the element of surprise. The attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which fulfilled the double purpose of facilitating tactical communication and mentally disorienting the enemy. UN forces initially had no familiarity with this tactic, and as a result some soldiers "bugged out," abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south.[36]:117 The Chinese Winter Offensive overwhelmed the UN Command forces and the PVA and KPA conquered Seoul on 4 January 1951.